Abstract In this paper we propose a multi-player extension of the minimum cost flow problem inspired by a transportation problem that arises in modern transportation industry. We associate one player with each arc of a directed network, each trying to minimize its cost function subject to the network flow constraints. In our model, the cost function can be any general nonlinear function, and the flow through each arc is an integer. We present algorithms to compute efficient Pareto optimal point(s), where the maximum possible number of players (but not all) minimize their cost functions simultaneously. The computed Pareto optimal points are Nash equilibriums if the problem is transformed into a finite static game in normal form.
Introduction
In recent years, product transportation systems are increasingly being dominated by retailers such as Amazon, Alibaba, Walmart etc, who utilize e-commerce solutions to fulfill customer supply chain expectations [2, 3, 4, 5] . In the supply chain strategy of these retailers, products located at different warehouses are shipped to geographically dispersed retail centers by different transportation organizations. These transportation organizations (carriers) compete among themselves and transport goods between warehouses and retail centers over multiple transportation links. For example, Amazon uses FedEX, UPS (United Parcel Service), AAR (Association of American Railroads) and other competing organizations to provide transportation services [6, Chapter 11] .
Product shipment from a warehouse to a retail center requires contracting multiple competing carriers, e.g., a common shipment may comprise of (i) a trucking shipment from the warehouse to a railhead provided by FedEx, then (ii) a rail shipment provided by AAR, and finally (iii) a trucking shipment from the rail yard to the retail center provided by UPS. It is common that and two objectives [25, 26, 27, 28] . A multi-player minimum cost flow problem with nonconvex cost functions is explored in [1] . Integer multi-commodity flow problems are investigated in [29, 30, 31] ; in these papers the underlying problems are optimization problems.
Contributions. In contrast, in this paper we propose an extension of the minimum cost flow problem to a multi-player setup and construct algorithms to compute efficient Pareto optimal solutions. Our problem can be interpreted as a multi-objective optimization problem [7, Section 4.7.5] with the objective vector consisting of a number of univariate general nonlinear cost functions subject to the network flow constraints and integer flows. In comparison with existing literature, we do not require the cost function to be of any specific structure. The only assumption on the cost functions is that they are proper. In contrast to relevant works in multi-objective network flow problems, our objective vector has an arbitrary number of components, however each component is a function of a decoupled single variable. We extend the setup to a class that is strictly larger than, but that contains, the network flow problems. We develop our algorithms for this larger class.
We show that, although in its original form the problem has coupled constraints binding every player, there exists an equivalent variable transformation that decouples the optimization problems for a maximal number of players. Solving these decoupled optimization problems can potentially lead to a significant reduction in the number of candidate points to be searched. We use the solutions of these decoupled optimization problems to reduce the size of the set of candidate efficient Pareto optimal solutions even further using algebraic geometry. Then we present algorithms to compute efficient Pareto optimal points that depend on a certain semialgebraic set being nonempty. We also present a penalty based approach applicable when the semi-algebraic set is empty which can be of value to network administrators and policymakers. To the best of our knowledge, our methodology is novel. The computed efficient Pareto optimal point has some desirable properties: it is (i) a good compromise solution between the utopian vector optimality and the generic Pareto optimality, and (ii) a Nash equilibrium if we convert our setup into a finite static game in normal form.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents notation and notions used in the paper. Section 2 describes the problem for directed networks and the extension to a strictly larger class. In Section 3 we transform the problem in our consideration into decoupled optimization problems for a number of player and reformulate the optimization problems for the rest of the players using consensus constraints. Section 4 presents algorithms for computing efficient Pareto optimal points for our problem if a certain semi-algebraic set is nonempty. Section 5 discusses a penalty based approach if the semi-algebraic set is empty. Section 6 presents an illustrative numerical example of our methodology in a transportation setup. Finally, in Section 7 we present some concluding remarks regarding our methodology. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Notation and notions. We denote the sets of real numbers, integers and natural numbers by R, Z and N respectively. The ith column, jth row and (i, j)th component of a matrix A ∈ R m×n is denoted by A i , a T j and a ij . The submatrix of a matrix A ∈ R m×n , which constitutes of its rows r 1 , r 1 + 1, . . . , r 2 , and columns c 1 , c 1 + 1, . . . , c 2 is denoted by A [r 1 :r 2 ,c 1 :
If we have a vector x ∈ R n , and we make two copies of it, the copies are denoted by x (1) and x (2) . By I i,j ∈ R n×n we denote a matrix which has a 1 on its (i, j)th position and 0 everywhere else. If C, D are two nonempty sets, then C + D = {x + y | x ∈ C, y ∈ D}. If A ∈ R m×n is a matrix and C is a nonempty set containing n-dimensional points, then AC = {Ax | x ∈ C}. The set of consecutive integers from 1 to n is denoted by [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and m to n is denoted by [m : n] = {m, m + 1, . . . , n}. Two copies of x ∈ R n are denoted by x (1) and x (2) . If we have two vectors x, y ∈ R n , then x y means
and we write x − y ∈ R n + . Consider a standard form polyhedron {x ∈ R n | Ax = b, x 0}, where A ∈ R m×n is a full row rank matrix and b ∈ R m . A basis matrix of this polyhedron is constructed as follows. We pick m linearly independent columns of A and construct the m × m invertible square submatrix out of those columns; the resultant matrix is called a basis matrix. The concept of basis matrix is pivotal in simplex algorithm, which is used to solve linear programming problem. Suppose we have a polyhedron defined by linear equality and inequality constraints in R n , and supposẽ x ∈ R n . Thenx is defined as a basic solution of the polyhedron, if atx all the equality constraints are active, and out of all the constraints (both equality and inequality) which are active atx, there are n of them, which are linearly independent.
Problem statement
Let G = (M, A) be a directed connected graph associated with a network, where M = [m + 1] is the set of nodes, and A = [n] is the set of (directed) arcs. With each arc j ∈ A, we associate one player, which we call the jth player. The variable controlled by the jth player is the nonnegative integral flow on arc j, denoted by x j ∈ Z. Each player is trying to minimize a proper cost function f j : Z → R, subject to the network flow constraints. We assume each of the cost functions is proper, i.e., for all i ∈ [n] we have −∞ ∈ f i (Z), and
There is an upper bound u j , which limits how much flow the jth player can carry through arc j. Without any loss of generality we take the lower bound on every arc to be 0 [9, Page 39]. The supply or demand of flow at each node i ∈ M is denoted by b i . If b i > 0, then i is a supply node; if b i < 0, then i is a demand node with a demand of −b i , and if b i = 0 then i is a trans-shipment node. We allow parallel arcs to exist between two nodes. The vector formed by all the decision variables is denoted by x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n . By x −j ∈ Z n−1 we denote the vector formed by all the players decision variables except jth player's decision variable. To put emphasis on the jth player's variable we sometimes write x as (x j , x −j ). Each player has a cost function f j (x j ) : Z → R, which depends on its variable x j . The goal of the jth player for j ∈ [n], given other players' strategies x −j ∈ Z n−1 , is to solve its minimization problem subject to the network constraints.
In any minimum cost flow problem there are three types of constraints.
(i) Mass balance constraint. The mass balance constraint states that for any node, the outflow minus inflow must equal the supply/demand of the node. We describe the constraint using nodearc incidence matrix. Let us fix a particular ordering of the arcs, and let x ∈ Z n be the the vector of flows that results, when the components x j s are ordered accordingly. We define the augmented node-arc incidence matrixÃ with each row corresponding to a node and each column corresponding to an arc. The symbolã ij denotes (i, j)th entry ofÃ, corresponding to ith node and jth arc, and is 1 if if i is the start node of the jth arc, −1 if i is the end node of the jth arc and 0 otherwise. Note that parallel arcs will correspond to different columns with same entries in the node arc incidence matrix. So every column ofÃ has exactly two nonzero entries, one equal to 1, one equal to −1, indicating the start node and the end node of the associated arc. Denote,b = (b 1 , . . . , b m , b m+1 ). Then, in matrix notation we write the mass balance constraint as:Ãx =b. The sum of the rows of A is equal to zero vector, so the rows are linearly independent. So, one of the constraints associated with the rows of the linear systemÃx −b is redundant, and by removing the last row of the linear system we can arrive at a system, Ax = b, where A =Ã [1:m,1:n] and b =b [1:m] . Now A is a full row rank matrix under the assumption of G being connected and i∈N b i = 0 [32, Corollary 7.1].
(ii) Flow bound constraint. The flow on any arc must satisfy the lower bound and capacity constraints, i.e., 0 x u. The flow bound constraint can often be relaxed or omitted in practice [7, pages 550-551] . In such cases flow direction is flexible or can overflow subject to a suitable penalty for some of the arcs.
(iii) Integrality constraint. The flow on any arc is integral, i.e., x ∈ Z n . This does not incur a significant loss of generality (see Remark 1 below).
So the constraint set, which we denote by P can be written as,
and the subset of P containing only the equality constraints is denoted by Q, so
Consider a set of players denoted by [n] . The decision variable controlled by the ith player is x i ∈ Z, i.e., each player has to take an integer valued action. The vector formed by all the decision variables is denoted by x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n . By x −i ∈ Z n−1 we denote the vector formed by all the players decision variables except ith player's decision variable. To put emphasis on the ith player's variable we sometimes write x as (x i , x −i ). Each player has a cost function f i (x i ) : Z → R, which depends on its variable x i . The goal of the ith player for i ∈ [n], given other players' strategies x −i ∈ Z n−1 , is to solve the minimization problem
Our objective is to calculate efficient Pareto optimal points for the problem. We define vector optimal points first, then Pareto optimal point and finally efficient Pareto optimal point.
Definition 1 (Vector optimal point) In problem (3), a point x vo ∈ P is vector optimal if it satisfies the following:
Definition 2 (Pareto optimal point) In problem (3), a point x po ∈ P is Pareto optimal if it satisfies the following: there does not exist another pointx ∈ P such that
with at least one index
Definition 3 (Efficient Pareto optimal point) In problem (3), a point x * is an efficient Pareto optimal solution, if it is Pareto optimal and it achieves partial vector optimality over a maximal subset of [n]; i.e., x * satisfies Equation (4) and the set S ⊆ [n] that satisfies
is maximal.
Remark 1 In our model we have taken the flow through any arc of the network to be integer. However this assumption does not incur a significant loss of generality, because we can use our integer model to obtain a real valued Pareto optimal solution to an arbitrary degree of accuracy by using the following scaling technique [9, page 545] . Suppose, we want a real valued Pareto optimal solution x * . Such a real valued Pareto optimal solution corresponds to a modified version of problem (3) with the last constraint being changed to x ∈ R n . In practice we always have an estimate of how many points after the decimal point we need to consider. So, in the modified problem we substitute each x i for i ∈ [n] with y i /α, where y i ∈ Z and α is chosen depending on the desired degree of accuracy (e.g., α=1, 000 or 10, 000 or larger depending on how many points after the decimal point we are interested in). Then we proceed with our methodology described in the subsequent sections to compute Pareto optimal solutions over integers. Assume, y * is one such integer Pareto optimal solution. Then
corresponds to a real valued Pareto optimal solution to the degree of accuracy of 1/α.
Remark 2
We can formulate our problem set an n person finite static game in normal form [33, pages 88-91] . A player i ∈ [n] has a finite, but possibly astronomical number of alternatives in problem (3) to choose from. Let m i denote the number of alternatives available to player i, and further define the index set M i = [m i ] = {1, . . . , m i }, with a typical element of the set designated as n i , which corresponds to some flow x i . If player j chooses a strategy n j ∈ M j , and this so for all j ∈ [n], then the cost incurred to player i is a single number a i n 1 ···nn that can be determined from problem (3). The ordered tuple of all these numbers (over i ∈ [n]), i.e., a 1 n 1 ···nn , a 2 n 1 ···nn , . . . , a n n 1 ···nn , constitutes the corresponding unique outcome of the game. For a strategy (n 1 · · · n n ), that violates any of the constraints in problem (3), the cost is taken as +∞. Players make their decisions independently and each one unilaterally seeks the minimum possible loss, of course by also taking into account the possible rational and feasible choices of the other players. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution concept within the context of this n-person game can be described as follows.
Definition 4 (Noncooperative Nash equilibrium) [33, page 88] An n-tuple of strategies n Nash 1 , . . . , n Nash n with n Nash i ∈ M i for all i ∈ [n], is said to constitute a noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution for an n-person nonzero-sum static finite game in normal form, as formulated above, if the following n inequalities are satisfied for all n i ∈ M i and all i ∈ [n] we have:
The flow corresponding to n Nash 1 , . . . , n Nash n is denoted by x Nash = x Nash 1 , . . . , x Nash n and is called the noncooperative Nash equilibrium flow. Here, the n-tuple (a 1,Nash , a 2,Nash , . . . , a n,Nash ) is known as a noncooperative (Nash) equilibrium outcome of the n-person game in normal form. Note that the strategy associated with an efficient Pareto optimal solution x * in Definition 3 also satisfies Equation (5) in Definition 4, thus it is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium flow. Now we extend the class of problems that we are going to investigate, which is strictly larger than the class defined by the problem (3) and contains it. We will develop our algorithms for this larger class. Everything defined in the previous subsection still holds, except we extend the constraint set P and the equality constraint set Q as follows. The structure of P is still that of a standard form integer polyhedron, i.e., P = {x ∈ Z n | Ax = b, 0 x u}, where A is full row rank, but it may not necessary be a node-arc incidence matrix. Denote the convex hull of the points in P by conv P . Consider the relaxed polyhedron relaxed P = {x ∈ R n | Ax = b, 0 x u}, where we have relaxed the condition of x being an integer vector. Now we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For any integer b, relaxed P has at least one integer basic solution.
As vertices of a polyhedron are also basic solutions [32, page 50], if conv P and relaxed P share at least one vertex, Assumption 1 will be satisfied. We can see immediately that if A is a node-arc incidence matrix then P will belong to this class, as conv P = relaxed P for network flow problems [34, Chapter 19] . In other practical cases of interest, the matrix can satisfy Assumption 1, e.g., matrices with upper or lower triangular square submatrices with diagonal entries 1, sparse matrices with m variables appearing only once with coefficients one etc. Moreover, at the expense of adding slack variables (thus making a larger dimensional problem) we can turn the problem in our consideration into one satisfying Assumption 1, though the computational price may be heavy.
In the rest of the paper whenever we mention Equations (1), (2) and (3), they correspond to this larger class of problems containing the network flow problems, and the full row rank matrix A is associated with this larger class. So, the results developed in the subsequent sections will hold for a network flow setup.
Remark 3
Before proceeding any further we note that the IP problems are N P-hard, in comparison with convex optimization problems. Even determining the existence of one feasible point in P is N P hard [35, page 242] . So, problem (3) is at least as hard.
Problem transformation
In this section we describe how to transform problem 3 into n − m decoupled optimization problems for the last n − m players and how to reformulate the optimization problems for the rest of the players using consensus constraints. These transformation and reformulation are necessary for the development of our algorithms.
3.1 Decoupling optimization problems for last n − m players First, we have the following lemma. Recall that, an integral square matrix is unimodular if its determinant is ±1.
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 holds if and only if we can extract a unimodular basis matrix from A.
Without any loss of generality, we rearrange the columns of the matrix A so that the unimodular basis matrix constitutes the first m columns, i.e., if
, and we reindex the variables accordingly. Let us denote
. Now we have the following Lemma.
, and the constraint set Q and P (defined in Equations (1) and (2) respectively) have the equivalent representation:
Before we present the next result, we recall the following definitions and facts. A matrix A ∈ Z m×n of full row rank is in Hermite normal form, if it is of the structure The following theorem is key in transforming the problem into an equivalent form with m decoupled optimization problems for players m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n.
Theorem 1
The constraint set Q defined in Equation 6 is nonempty and for any vector x can be maximally decomposed in terms of a new variable z as follows:
where
. Now in the new variable z we can transform our problem. The advantage of this transformation is that for player m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n, we have decoupled optimization problems. By solving them we can reduce the constraint set significantly (especially when the number of minimizers for the constraint set are small).
From Theorem 1, (3), we can write the optimization problem for any player m + i for i ∈ [n − m] as follows.
Each of these optimization problems is a decoupled univariate optimization problem, which can be easily solved graphically. We can optimize over real numbers, then find the minimizers of the resultant relaxed optimization problem, and then determine whether the floor or ceiling of such a minimizer results in the minimum cost, and pick that as a minimizer of the original problem. Solving n − m decoupled optimization problems immediately reduces the constraint set into a much smaller set. Let us denote the set of different optimal solutions for player m + i
Consensus reformulation for the first m players
In this section we transform the optimization problems in z for the first m players (see Equation (8)) using consensus constraints. Consider the optimization problems for the first m players in variable z, which have coupled costs due to (8) . We deal with the issue by introducing consensus constraints [36, Section 5.2]. We provide each player i ∈ [m] with its own local copy of z, denoted by z (i) ∈ Z n−m , which acts as its decision variable. This local copy has to satisfy the following conditions. First, using (8) 
The copy z (i) has to be in consensus with the rest of the first m players, i.e., z (i) = z (j) for all j ∈ [m] \ {i}. Second, the copy z (i) has to satisfy the flow bound constraints, i.e., 0
. Third, for the last n − m players z i ∈ D i , as obtained from the solutions of the decoupled optimization problems (9), so z (i) has to be in D, i.e.,for all i ∈ [m] we have
So, for all i ∈ [m], the ith player's optimization problem in variable z (i) can be written as:
An integer linear inequality constraint α ≤ v ≤ β, where α, β, v ∈ Z is equivalent to v ∈ {α, α + 1, . . . , β}
Using this fact, we write the last two constraints in (10) in polynomial forms as follows.
Hence, for all i ∈ [m] any feasible z (i) for problem (10) comes from the following set:
In (13), the intersection in the first line ensures that the consensus constraints are satisfied, and the second line just expands the first. So, the optimization problem (10) is equivalent to
for i ∈ [m], i.e., each of these players are optimizing over a common constraint set F. So, finding the points in F is of interest.
Algorithms
In this section, first, we review some necessary background on algebraic geometry, and then we present a theorem to check if F is nonempty, and provide an algorithm to compute the points in a nonempty F. Finally, we present our algorithm to compute efficient Pareto optimal points. In devising our algorithm we use algebraic geometry rather than integer programming techniques for the following reasons. First, in this way we are able to provide an algebraic geometric characterization for the set of efficient Pareto optimal solutions for our problem. Second, we can show that this set is nonempty if and only if the reduced Groebner basis (disucussed in Section 4.1 below) of a certain set associated with the problem is not equal to {1} (Theorem 3). Third, the mentioned result has an algorithmic significance: the reduced Groebner basis can be used to construct algorithms to calculate efficient Pareto optimal points.
Background on Algebraic Geometry
A monomial in variables x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is a product of the structure x α = x α 1 1 · · · x αn n , where α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ N n . A polynomial is an expression that is the sum of finite number of terms with each term being a monomial times a (real or complex) coefficient. The set of all real polynomials in x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with real and complex coefficients are denoted by R[x] and C[x], respectively, with the variable ordering x 1 > x 2 > · · · > x n . The ideal generated by
Consider f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f s which are polynomials in C[x]. The affine variety V of f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m is given by
A monomial order on C[x 1 , . . . , x n ] is a relation, denoted by , on the set of monomials x α , α ∈ N n satisfying the following. It is a total order, if x α x β and x γ is any monomial, then x α+γ x β+γ , and every nonempty subset of N n has a smallest element under . We will use lexicographic order, where we say x α lex x β if and only if the left most nonzero entry of α − β is positive. Suppose we are given a monomial order and a polynomial f (x) = α∈S f α x α . The leading term of the polynomial with respect to , denoted by lt (f ), is that monomial f α x α with f α = 0, such that x α x β for all other monomials x β with f β = 0. The monomial x α is called the leading monomial of f . Consider a nonzero ideal I. The set of the leading terms for the polynomials in I is denoted by lt (I). Thus lt (I) = {cx α | (∃f ∈ I) lt (f ) = cx α } . By ideal {lt (I)} with respect to we denote the ideal generated by the elements of lt (I).
A Groebner basis G of an ideal I with respect to monomial order is a finite set of polynomials g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ I such that ideal {lt (I)} = ideal {lt (g 1 ) , . . . , lt (g t )} . A reduced Groebner basis G reduced, for an ideal I is a Groebner basis for I with respect to monomial order such that, for any f ∈ G reduced, , the coefficient associated with lt (f ) is 1, and for all f ∈ G reduced, , no monomial of f lies in ideal {lt (G \ {f })}. For a nonzero ideal I and given monomial ordering the reduced Groebner basis is unique [Proposition 6, 37, Page 92]. Suppose, I = ideal {f 1 , . . . , f m } ⊆ C [x 1 , . . . , x n ]. Then for any l ∈ [n], the lth elimination ideal for I is defined by I l = I ∩ C[x l+1 , . . . , x n ].Let I ⊆ C [x 1 , . . . , x n ] be an ideal and let G be a Groebner basis of I with respect to lexicographic order with x 1 x 2 . . . x n . Then for every integer l ∈ {0, n − 1} the set G l = G ∩ C [x l+1 , . . . , x n ] is a Groebner basis for the lth elimination ideal I l .
Nonemptyness of F
We will use the following theorem in proving the results in this section. 
First, we present the following result.
Theorem 3 The set F is nonempty if and only
where G reduced, is the reduced Groebner basis of ideal {q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m } with respect to any ordering.
Remark 4 Note that in the proof, we have shown that feasibility of the system (25) in C n−m is equivalent to its feasibility feasibility in Z n−m . So, V (q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m ) ∩ Z n−m = V (q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m ) .
If we are interested in just verifying the feasibility of the polynomial system, then calculating a reduced Groebner basis with respect to any ordering suffices. However, if we are interested in extracting the feasible points, then we choose lexicographic ordering, as lexicographic ordering allows us to use algebraic elimination theory. There are many computer algebra packages to compute reduced Groebner basis such as Macaulry2, SINGULAR, FGb, Maple, Mathematica etc. Now we describe how to extract the points in F.
Suppose G reduced, = {1}. Naturally the next question is how to compute points in F? In the next section we will show that the points in F are related to the efficient Pareto optimal points that we are seeking. Now we briefly discuss systematic methods for extracting F based on algebraic elimination theory, a branch of computational algebraic geometry. For details on elimination theory, we refer the interested readers to [37, Chapter 3] . First we present the following lemma.
Algorithm 1 below calculates all the points in F, when G reduced, lex = {1}. Lemma 6 proves its accuracy.
Lemma 6 Algorithm 1 correctly calculates all the points in F, when it is nonempty.
Finding efficient Pareto optimal points from F
Suppose, G reduced, lex = {1}, and using Algorithm 1 we have computed F, which is nonempty. Now we propose Algorithm 2 and show that the resultant points are Pareto optimal.
We have the following results for Algorithm 2.
Lemma 7 In Algorithm 2, for all
Lemma 8 In Algorithm 2 for any i ∈ [m], x s i ∈ X * s i (the set X * i is defined in Step 1, 3 of Algorithm 2) if and only if z * ∈ F * s i . Furthermore, z * ∈ F * s i solves the following optimization problem
Algorithm 1 Extracting the points in F
Input: Polynomial system q i (z) = 0 for i ∈ [m] and r j (z) = 0 for j ∈ [n − m], G reduced, lex = {1}. Output: The set F.
Step 1.
-Calculate the set G n−m−1 = G reduced, lex ∩ C [z n−m ] ,which is a Groebner basis of the (n − m)th elimination ideal of ideal {q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m } and consists of univariate polynomials in z n−m as an implication of [37, page 116, Theorem 2].
-Find the variety of G n−m−1 , denoted by V (G n−m−1 ) , which will contain the list all possible z n−m coordinates for the points in F.
Step 2.
-
, which is again a Groebner basis of the (n− m − 1)th elimination ideal of ideal {q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m }and consists of bivariate polynomials in z n−m and z n−m−1 .
-From Step 1, we already have the z n−m coordinates for the points in F. So, by substituting those |V (G n−m−1 )| values in G n−m−2 , denoted by we arrive at set of a set of univariate polynomials in z n−m−1 , which we denote by {Ḡ
.
-For all i = 1, 2, . . . , |V (G n−m−1 )|, find the variety ofḠ
n−m−2 ) which will contain the list all possible z n−m−1 coordinates associated with a particular z n−m ∈ V (G n−m−1 ). Now we have all the possible (z n−m−1 , z n−m ) coordinates of F.
Step 3.
-We repeat this procedure for G n−m−3 , G n−m−4 , . . . , G 0 . In the end, we have set of all points in F.
return F.
Note that, in Algorithm 2, at no stage can F * s i get empty. Lemma 9 Suppose F = ∅. Then in Algorithm 2, F * s i is nonempty for any i ∈ [m].
Theorem 4 For any z * ∈ F * sm ,
is an efficient Pareto optimal point.
A penalty based approach when F is empty
In the case that F is empty, we design a penalty based approach to solve a penalized version of problem (14) that can be of use to network administrators and policy makers. First note that, for i ∈ [m], using Equations (13), (12) and (11), problem (14) can be written in the following equivalent form:
Algorithm 2 Computing the set of solutions to problem (14) .
Input: The optimization problem (14) for any i ∈ [m], F = ∅. Output: Efficient Pareto optimal solutions for problem (3).
for i = 1, . . . , m
end for
Sort the elements of the {X i } m i=1 s with respect to cardinality of the elements in a descending order. Denote the index set of the sorted set by {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m } such that
Solve the univariate optimization problem
and denote the set of solutions by X * si . Set
end if end for return F * sm .
When F = ∅, we relate the problem above to a penalized version, which is a standard practice in operations research literature [38, Page 278] . In this penalized version, we disregard the equality constraints q k (z (i) ) = 0 for k ∈ [m], rather we we augment the cost with a term that penalizes the violation of these equality constraints. So a penalized version of the problem (22) is as follows:
where p : R → R + is a penalty function, and γ k is a positive penalty parameter. Some common penalty functions are:
-power barrier: p : x → |x|, etc.
We have already shown D to be a nonempty set. From a network point of view, the penalized problem (23) has the following interpretation. For the first m arcs in the directed network of consideration, rather than having a strict flow bound constraint, for i ∈ [m] (see the discussion in Section 2) i.e., 0 ≤ x i ≤ u i ,we have a penalty when
The flow bound constraint is still maintained for i ∈ [m + 1 : n]. In this regard, the original problem defined by (3) has the following penalized version:
Problem (24) can be considered as a network flow problem, where flow direction is flexible or can overflow subject to a suitable penalty for some of the arcs, which is a quite realistic scenario in practice Boyd and Vandenberghe [7, pages 550-551] . With this penalized problem, we can proceed as follows. In the developments of Section 4.3 set:
and then apply Algorithm 2 which will calculate efficient Pareto optimal points for the penalized problem (24). The described penalty scheme can be of use to network administrators and policy makers to enforce a decision making architecture. Such an architecture would allow the players to make independent decisions while ensuring that (i) total amount of flow is conserved in the network by maintaining the mass balance constraint, (ii) the flow bound constraint is strictly enforced for the last n − m players and is softened for the first m players by imposing penalty, and yet (iii) an efficient Pareto optimal point for the penalized problem can be achieved by the players where none of their objective functions can be improved without worsening some of the other players' objective values.
From both the players and the policy maker's point of view, the penalty based approach makes sense and can be considered fair for the following reason. In the exact version, each of the last n − m players gets to minimize its optimization problem (9) in a decoupled manner , whether each of the first m players is solving a more restrictive optimization problem (18) . So, cutting the first m players some slack by softening the flow bound constraint, where they can carry some extra flow or flow in opposite direction by paying a penalty, can be considered fair.
Numerical example
Consider the following directed network with 5 nodes and 16 arcs as shown in Figure 1 . Nodes 2 and 4 represent two retail centers with demands for 13 and 11 units of a certain product. The warehouses are denoted by nodes 1 and 3, which supply 9 and 15 units respectively. Node 5 is a transshipment node. Different modes of shipment from one node to other is represented by the arcs in the figure, and each of these shipments are carried out by different organizations i.e., carriers. The cost of a certain shipment depends on the number of products shipped and is nonlinear and not necessarily convex. With each arc we associate one carrier (player). Each of the players is trying to minimize its cost. We seek efficient Pareto optimal points in this setup.
The node-arc incidence matrix of the matrix is: 
The vectorb is (9, −13, 15, −11, 0) . We can get the reduced node-arc incidence matrix A by removing the 5th row ofÃ and the resource vector b by removing the last component ofb . So, m = 4, n = 16. We associate player i with ith column of A. Without any loss of generality, we rearrange the columns of the matrix A so that the unimodular basis matrix constitutes the first 4 columns, i.e., if (5, 6, 6, 10, 10, 7, 11, 13, 16, 12, 4, 5, 6, 14, 13, 15) .
The cost functions for the players are listed in Table 1 . For this example, we have from Theorem 1
First we solve the decoupled univariate optimization problems for the last 12 players (problem (9)). The solution set is given by Table 2 . We define
We define polynomial systems (11) and (12), and apply Algorithm 1. We find that G reduced, = {1}, and the associated F is given by Table 3 . Now we apply Algorithm 2 to find efficient Pareto optimal points, which are 
+ 330, else 
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a multi-player extension of the minimum cost flow problem inspired by a multi-player transportation problem arising in modern transportation industry. We have associated one player with each arc of a directed connected network, each trying to minimize its cost subject to the network flow constraints. The cost can be any general nonlinear function, and the flow through each arc is taken to be integer. In this multi-player setup, we have presented algorithms to compute an efficient Pareto optimal point, which is a good compromise solution between the utopian vector optimality and the generic Pareto optimality, and also acts as a Nash equilibrium if our problem is transformed into an n-person finite static game in normal form. Some concluding remarks on the limitations of our methodology are as follows. First, the heart of our methodology is the transformation provided by Theorem 1, which decouples the optimization problems for the last n−m players. Each of these decoupled optimization problems is univariate over a discrete interval, and is easy to solve. This can potentially allow us to work in a much smaller search space. So, if we have a system where n − m > m ⇔ m < n 2 , then it will be convenient from a numerical point of view. Second, computation of Pareto optimal points depends on determining the points in F using Groebner basis. Calculating Groebner basis can be numerically challenging for large system [37, pages 111-112] , though in recent years significant speed-up has been achieved by computer algebra packages such as Macaulry2, SINGULAR, FGb etc. 
whereB i is the same asB, except the ith column has been replaced withb. Now detB i ∈ Z, because b is an integer vector. So having integer basic solution is equivalent to detB = ±1, i.e., B is unimodular.
Proof of Lemma 2
First note that unimodularity of B is equivalent to unimodularity of B −1 , which we show easily as follows. First note that, det B −1 = 
Proof of Lemma 3
First recall that the following operations on a matrix are called elementary integer column operations: (i) adding an integral multiple of one column to another column, (ii) exchanging two columns, and (iii) multiplying a column by -1.
The matrix C is of the form
Consider the first column of C. For all j = m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n, we multiply the first column of C, C 1 = e 1 of C by −C 1,j and then add it to C i . Thus C is transformed to
Similarly for column indices, i = 2, 3, . . . , m respectively we do the following. For j = m + 1, m + 2, · · · , n, we multiply the ith column e i with −C i,j and add it to C j . In the end the Hermite normal form becomes:
The steps describing the process described in Lemma 3 can be summarized by Algorithm 3, which we are going to use to prove Lemma 4. for j := m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n do 4:
end for 6: end for 7: end procedure
Proof of Lemma 4
If we multiply column C i of a matrix C with an integer factor γ and then add it to another column C j , then it is equivalent to right multiplying the matrix C with a matrix I + γI ij (recall that the matrix I ij has a one in (i, j)th position and zero everywhere else). Note that I + γI ij is a triangular matrix with diagonal entries being one, γ being on the (i, j)th position and zero everywhere else. As the determinant of a triangular matrix is the product of its diagonal entries, det(I + γI ij ) = 1, so I + γI ij is a unimodular matrix. So step 4 of the procedure above to convert C to Hermite normal form, i.e., C j = C j − C i,j e i is equivalent to left multiplying the current matrix with I − C i,j I ij . So the inner loop of the procedure over j = m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n (lines 2-4) can be achieved by left multiplying the current matrix with
As each of the matrices in the product is a unimodular matrix and determinant of multiplication of square matrices of same size is equal to multiplication of determinant of those matrices, we have det(U i ) = 1. so U i is a unimodular matrix. Structurally the ith row of U i , denoted by u T i , has a 1 on ith position, has −C i,j on jth position for j = m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n, and zero everywhere else. Any other kth row (k = i) of U i is e T k . So we can convert C to its Hermite normal form by repeatedly left multiplying C with U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U m respectively. This is equivalent to left multiplying C with one single matrix U = m i=1 U i . The final matrix U is unimodular as it is multiplication of unimodular matrices.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let y = U −1 x. As U is unimodular, so is U −1 , so x ∈ Z n ⇔ y ∈ Z n . Let y = (y 1 , y 2 ) where y 1 ∈ Z m and y 2 ∈ Z n−m . So 
Putting z =z in Equation (26) and using Equation (27) we get 1 = 0, so we have a contradiction.
We want to show that if 1 ∈ ideal{q 1 , · · · , q m , r 1 , · · · , r n−m } then the polynomial system (25) is feasible. We prove the contrapositive again: if the polynomial system (25) is infeasible in integers then 1 ∈ ideal{q 1 , · · · , q m , r 1 , · · · , r n−m }.
First we show that, feasibility of the system in C n−m is equivalent to feasibility in Z n−m . As Z n−m ⊂ C n−m , if the polynomial system is infeasible in C n−m , it is infeasible in Z n−m . Also, if the polynomial system is infeasible in Z n−m then it will be infeasible in C n−m . We show this by contradiction. Assume the system system is infeasible in Z n−m but feasible in C n−m i.e., C n−m \ Z n−m . Let that feasible solution bez ∈ C n−m \ Z n−m , so there is at least one component of it (sayĩ) such thatzĩ ∈ C \ Z. Now rĩ(z) = (zĩ − z i,1 )(zĩ − z i,2 ) . .
where by construction each of the elements of the set D i = {z i,1 , z i,2 , . . . , z i,p i } are integers and different from each other, so each component in the product rĩ(z) are nonzero complex numbers with the absence of complex conjugates. So, rĩ(z) = 0, which is a contradiction.
If the polynomial system is infeasible in C n−m then it is equivalent to saying that, V (q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m ) = ∅, where V has been defined in Equation (15) . Then using the Weak Nullstellensatz it implies ideal{q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m } = C[z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n−m ].
As 1 ∈ C[z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n−m ], this means 1 ∈ ideal{q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m }.
Step 2. Now we show 1 / ∈ ideal {q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m } is equivalent to G reduced, = {1} First note that, we have shown that feasibility of the system in C n−m is equivalent to feasibility in Z n−m . As a result, we can work over complex numbers, which is a algebraically closed field. This allows us to apply consistency algorithm [37, page 172], which states that 1 / ∈ ideal {q 1 , . . . , q m , r 1 , . . . , r n−m } if and only if G reduced, = {1} .
Proof of Lemma 5
By Theorem 3 we have F = ∅. So from the definition of affine variety in (15) and (13) we can write F as: 
Proof of Lemma 6
Using Theorem 3 we have G reduced, lex = ∅. So, by the elimination theorem [Theorem 2, 37, page 116] V (G n−m−1 ) is nonempty and will contain list all possible z n−m coordinates for the points in F. As G reduced, lex = ∅, when moving from one step to the next, not all the affine varieties associated with the univariate polynomials (after replacing the previous coordinates into the elimination ideal) can be empty due to the extension theorem [Theorem 3, 37, page 118]. Using this logic repeatedly, the final step will give us F = V (G reduced, lex ) = ∅.
Proof of Lemma 7
Follows from Equations (19), (17) and (20) .
Proof of Lemma 8 For any i ∈ [m]
x s i ∈ X * s i
where the second line follows from Equation (8) . So,
where the second line follows from Equation (20) in Algorithm 2.
Proof of Lemma 9
As F = ∅, X s 1 :
The subsequent optimization problem is minimize xs i+1 f s i+1 (x s i+1 ) subject to x s i+1 ∈ X s i+1 .
As we are optimizing over a finite and countable set, a minimizer will exist. So, X * s i+1 = ∅. Hence F * s i = x i ∈X * s i (X * s i ) −1 (x i ) = ∅. So, for any i = 1, . . . , m we have F * s i nonempty.
Proof of Theorem 4

